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On-Demand Labor: Tactics of Flexibility and Control 
Abstract. This poster explores the perspectives of workers in on-demand posi-
tions managed through online platforms. Our interview-based study considers 
how Uber drivers perceive their employment status, how they view Uber’s man-
agement tactics and how they modify their work practices in order to control their 
schedules and wages. We found that workers tended to view themselves as inde-
pendent contractors and had strong understandings of the tactics used by Uber to 
manage the supply of drivers. However, we also found that they do not view their 
responses to these tactics as a form of resistance. Instead of seeing their employ-
ment status as a problem that calls for collective action, drivers were primarily 
interested in increasing their own wages. 
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1 Introduction 
Uber is a mobile phone application that connects people who need transportation with 
a pool of available drivers. New technological systems like Uber are currently 
changing how people work—for example, an ongoing debate concerns the employment 
status of Uber drivers, who the company claims are not employees but instead 
independent contractors (Chen, Mislove, and Wilson, 2015). A key question in this 
debate is the extent to which Uber controls its drivers, such as by encouraging them to 
work at specific times (Scheiber 2017). Rosenblat and Stark (2015), for example, 
introduce the concept of soft control in describing how surveillance and data 
collections practices allow Uber to covertly shape drivers’ actions.  
While drivers’ employment status is a matter of active and ongoing debate (in courts 
and academic literature), few studies have considered the perspectives of workers in 
on-demand positions that are managed through online platforms. In order to contribute 
to this emerging area of interest, we present an interview-based study focused on Uber 
drivers’ perceptions of their own employment status, as well as their practices in 
negotiating between the flexibility of on-demand work and the incentives used by Uber 
to control their work practices. 
2 Methods 
In order to understand Uber drivers’ perceptions and practices, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with current drivers. We employed a variety of techniques to find 
participants, including visiting locations where drivers congregate, posting to message 
boards for drivers and snowball sampling. We conducted 18 interviews either in person, 
via web conferencing or over the phone, with the duration ranging from 15 minutes to 
45 minutes; the average interview lasted 18 minutes. 
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We transcribed the interviews and iteratively read and coded drivers’ responses. 
After identifying an initial set of themes, we returned to drivers’ responses in order to 
discuss the codes we developed and refine our schema. We ultimately focused our anal-
ysis on three topics: drivers’ perceptions of their employment status, Uber’s tac-tics to 
control drivers and drivers’ tactics to retain control of their work. 
3 Findings 
The majority of participants did not see Uber as their employer, instead seeing them-
selves as self-employed independent contractors. However, despite this perception, 
most participants expressed a strong dislike of how Uber treats drivers. One driver, for 
example, expressed this frustration when saying “Oh, I identify them as an employer 
all right, [but] they may not identify me as an employee.” Similar frustrations were 
consistent among participants. As we describe below, many participants had strong un-
derstandings of how Uber manages drivers in order to maximize profits, and, as a result, 
described their dislike of and resistance to Uber’s tactics. As one driver said, “I feel like 
Uber ... I guess exploits drivers”. 
3.1 Tactics of Control 
While classifying Uber drivers as independent contractors suggests that drivers have 
full autonomy over their behavior and choices, drivers described several ways Uber 
utilizes software algorithms to monitor, evaluate and track their performance in order 
to manage the supply of workers on the platform. The tactics described by drivers in-
clude motivational messages, surge pricing and driver ratings.  
Drivers reported receiving emails, motivational messages and promotions meant to 
incentivize them to drive during specific times such as on a holiday or during a concert. 
In regards to emails, one driver reported that Uber employed a “psychological trick” by 
sending the driver an email stating that they’ve already made $260 and suggesting that 
they “make it an even $300,” a tactic meant to motivate drivers to continue working 
longer than intended. Motivational messages sent to drivers often guaranteed a specific 
hourly rate if they met criteria such as accepting 80% of offered rides and averaging at 
least one and a half rides per hour. Another driver mentioned that Uber offered promo-
tions if drivers worked during a designated time.  
Drivers described surge pricing as another tactic used by Uber to control their work. 
Surge pricing is a feature of Uber’s platform that raises ride prices in specific areas, for 
example charging riders more on weekend nights. Drivers often perceived surge pricing 
as incentivizing them to drive to areas in hopes of earning a higher fare and described 
it as a way to fill a shortage of drivers in an area. In describing Uber’s tactics in relation 
to concepts such as supply and demand, drivers exhibited strong awareness not only of 
how they were being incentivized but also why.  
Finally, drivers also described ways that the driver rating system affected their work 
practices. As participants noted, receiving ratings below 4.5 could result in the deacti-
vation of drivers’ accounts. As a result, many drivers stated that they modified their 
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behavior to be more customer-centric by, for example, providing customers with water 
bottles or helping with their luggage. One driver tries to be “happy and upbeat” as a 
way to earn five stars from passengers. Another driver complained that the rating sys-
tem “forces drivers to make extra stops for passengers for the fear that a passenger will 
give them one or lower on their rating.”  
 
3.2 Maintaining Control 
We found that drivers used a variety of tactics that decreased Uber's control of their 
work practices, including keeping the app on while relaxing at their homes and simul-
taneously using multiple on-demand employment apps. However, while participants 
demonstrated a strong awareness of how Uber encourages them to work at specific 
times and locations, they did not describe their tactics as direct resistance. Instead, they 
focused on how they were able to make more money or better integrate their work for 
Uber with their other activities.  
A main tactic taken by drivers is to manipulate the rides they accept in order to re-
ceive higher fares. For example, while Uber assumes that drivers will keep the app 
turned on when they are willing to accept rides, one driver described strategically leav-
ing it off: “One tactic that I kind of picked up was, before I turned the driver notification 
on to let riders know I’m available, I would drive to a busy area.”  
Other drivers described their practice of strategically refusing rides. When drivers 
are offered a ride, they have limited information that would allow them to predict how 
profitable it will be—however, once they have accepted the ride, they are able to make 
a judgement. Some drivers described how, although Uber discourages the practice, they 
will selectively reject rides they have accepted as a way to increase their earnings: 
“When I started I would accept every ride that came along. Now I probably won’t ac-
cept rides that are over ten minutes away. Before I was more likely to allow over four 
passengers into my car and now I’m very strict in not letting that happen.” In this way, 
drivers are also able to maintain their ideal driving range. 
The most common tactic described by drivers was driving away from areas of surge 
pricing. As one driver stated, “Rule number one: always do not chase the surge. Ever. 
If you see a surge area, don’t drive toward it, drive away from it.” The driver went on 
to argue that, because surge pricing changes frequently, drivers likely arrive too late to 
take advantage of increased fares. Other drivers expressed the same opinion, noting that 
less-experienced drivers were likely to crowd the area around the surge and quickly 
cause fares to return to normal. While drivers understand that Uber uses surge pricing 
to manage the supply of drivers, many bluntly expressed their unwillingness to go along 
with this tactic, with one driver calling it “an Uber scam to get drivers to certain areas.” 
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4 Discussion 
While we describe drivers’ practices as resisting Uber’s tactic of control, it’s important 
to note that they primarily describe their actions only as increasing their earnings. De-
spite expressing a strong awareness of how Uber “exploits” drivers through various 
incentives and surveillance practices, drivers, in the end, accepted the flexibility of the 
work offered and, for the most part, only wanted to make more per hour.  
Driver’s perspectives contrast with the way on-demand employment is discussed in 
other contexts. For example, while class-action lawsuits contesting the classification of 
drivers as independent contractors have received considerable attention, the drivers we 
spoke with don’t describe desires to organize or engage in large-scale collective action. 
Instead, they often describe tactics that, while not beneficial for Uber, are probably also 
not necessarily beneficial for other drivers. Rejecting a low-paying ride, for example, 
only puts that ride back in the pool to be accepted by other drivers. In this respect, 
drivers do behave as independent contractors, interested in being treated fairly—but 
fairly as individuals and not as a collection of employees.  
5 Conclusion 
Drivers have complicated relationships with Uber. They don’t see the company as their 
employer, but they do feel as if they are exploited for their work. They don’t necessarily 
oppose the strategies Uber uses to manage its workforce, but they often take issue with 
the specific ways those strategies are implemented. And drivers resist efforts to control 
their behavior not by rejecting the platform and looking for other work or by collec-
tively organizing but instead by finding ways to manipulate the platform’s rules in their 
favor. As work is increasingly performed through on-demand platforms, it’s important 
to understand how workers maintain control of their time and income. As the drivers 
we interviewed indicate, new technologies may result in new and unanticipated forms 
of resistance.  
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